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At first glance, the differences between the two 
candidates for president of the United States in 
2012, Barack Obama and Mitt Romney, are 
striking. One is black; the other white. One 
paid off his student loans a few years ago; the 
other was born rich. One is cool – well, coolish; 
the other is definitely not cool. One made his 
name with a speech; the other is a master of 
PowerPoint. One was formerly a community 
organiser; the other was a management 
consultant and private equity executive. 
 
Each candidate is doing his best to emphasise 
his differences from the other. At the 
Democratic National Convention in Charlotte, 
NC, Obama said the election represented ‘a 
choice between two different paths for 
America… A choice between two 
fundamentally different visions for the future.’1 
In his own convention speech, Romney claimed 
that Obama has departed from ‘the bipartisan 
foreign policy legacy of Truman and Reagan’ 
and promised: ‘under my presidency we will 
return to it once again.’2 Recent unrest in the 
Middle East over an anti-Islamic video has 
seemingly widened the divide between the two 
men.   
 
Many commentators have also drawn sharp 
distinctions between the two candidates on 
foreign policy. Gideon Rachman of the 
Financial Times, for example, argues that in 
contrast to Obama’s emphasis on diplomacy, a 
Romney presidency promises ‘a return to the 
Manichean world view of George W. Bush – in 
which nations are divided firmly into friends 
and enemies of the US and policy is set 
accordingly.’ Bruce Jentleson and Charles 
Kupchan agree that ‘Romney is poised to take 
the United States down a dangerous path on 
foreign policy.’3  
Global perceptions of the two men are also 
strikingly different. Most of the Western world 
seems to want Obama to win. Recent polls 
have found, for example, that 92 per cent of 
French respondents, 89 per cent of German 
respondents and 73 per cent of British 
respondents want Obama to be re-elected. 
Closer to home, the 2012 Lowy Institute Poll 
found that 80 per cent of Australians would 
prefer Obama to win, compared to only 9 per 
cent who would prefer Romney. This result 
was even more unbalanced than in 2008, when 
then-Senator Barack Obama’s margin over 
Republican candidate Senator John McCain 
was 73 per cent to 16 per cent.4  
 
The argument of this Analysis, however, is that 
when it comes to foreign policy, the similarities 
between the two men are more striking than 
the differences. Americans face an important 
choice on 6 November, but when it comes to 
foreign policy, it is not likely to be an epochal 
moment. 
 
This is a very different situation from the 2008 
presidential race. Obama and McCain were 
(and remain) a study in contrasts. They hold 
contrasting visions of America’s role in the 
world: Obama is cautious, interest-focused and 
disinclined toward confrontation; McCain is 
hawkish, impulsive and forward-leaning. Their 
differences – in terms of ends, means, 
temperaments and the global responses they 
elicited – were more conspicuous than their 
similarities. I argued in 2008 that Obama 
offered hope and McCain offered glory.5  
 
This year, by contrast, the two candidates for 
president are relatively similar in foreign policy 
orientation. My argument rests on two 
assertions: that President Obama is not as left-
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wing and dovish as many believe, and 
Governor Romney is not as right-wing and 





On a frigid morning on 20 January 2009, I 
attended Barack Obama’s inauguration as 
president on the steps of the Capitol building. 
More than a million others were assembled on 
the National Mall to witness the event. A few 
hours before Obama laid his hand on Abraham 
Lincoln’s bible to take the oath of office, I 
looked up to see a bald eagle – America’s 
national symbol – soaring and swooping over 
the Capitol dome. When I pointed this out to a 
Republican lady standing beside me, she 
assured me bluntly this was no heavenly sign. 
She said it must have been a trained eagle that 
the Obama campaign had put up in the sky to 
attract positive media attention. 
 
I do not believe that it was a trained eagle. But 
in a larger sense, my interlocutor was correct. 
The presidential campaign run by Obama and 
his team was marked by discipline, effectiveness 
and a laser-like focus on maximising his self-
interest. No wonder the Republican suspected 
the eagle over the Capitol was a brilliant 
campaign move.  
 
The same qualities have been apparent in his 
foreign policy. The president has governed as a 
cautious realist, focused principally on 
America’s national interests. Obama’s speeches 
as a candidate – from his breakthrough speech 
at the 2004 Democratic National Convention 
in Boston to his acceptance speech in Chicago’s 
Grant Park in November 2008 – were about 
hope and change. Yet, as a politician, he is a 
pragmatic, almost post-ideological figure. In his 
statements on foreign policy, he has claimed the 
mantle of ‘foreign policy realism,’ advocating ‘a 
clear-eyed view of how the world works,’ and 
‘tough, thoughtful, realistic, diplomacy,’ and 
calling in aid not only traditional Democratic 
foreign policy heroes such as Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman, Dean Acheson 
and John F. Kennedy but also George F. 
Kennan, Brent Scowcroft, James A. Baker and 
George H.W. Bush.6  
 
He has governed as a foreign policy realist, too. 
The themes of Obama’s foreign policy are not 
hope and change, but reasonableness and 
balance. As president, he has engaged with all 
sorts of troublesome regimes. He shook hands 
with Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and 
pressed the ‘reset’ button on relations with 
Russia. He was slow to stand up for protestors 
on the streets of Tehran and to meet with the 
Dalai Lama, in order to better engage with Iran 
and China. He set aside the freedom agenda of 
the right and the human rights agenda of the 
left, and earned their criticism for it. During the 
Arab uprisings, Obama was slow to turn on 
America’s old ally President Hosni Mubarak, 
and he only did so when Mubarak was 
finished. 
 
Obama has also demonstrated a clear 
willingness to use force, sometimes unilaterally, 
to protect US security and interests. Obama 
was initially seen as an ‘antiwar’ president, and 
indeed he might not have defeated Hillary 
Clinton for the Democratic nomination in 2008 
had he not opposed the Iraq war. Yet he was 
never a pacifist: his speech in 2002 against the 
Iraq war was far from the standard left-wing 
critique. ‘I don’t oppose all wars,’ he said then. 
‘What I am opposed to is a dumb war… a rash 
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war, a war based not on reason but on passion, 
not on principle but on politics.’ In office, 
Obama has used force often, starting with his 
operation to free American hostages being held 
by Somali pirates in 2009. In order to degrade 
al-Qaeda, he has ordered more than 250 drone 
strikes in Pakistan in the last three years, which 
are estimated to have killed at least 1500 
people and perhaps many more. He oversaw 
Operation Olympic Games, the cyber-attack on 
Iran’s nuclear program. He has drawn down in 
both Iraq and Afghanistan – but only after 
surging in Afghanistan. He helped fight the 
battle to unseat Gaddafi in Libya. And, of 
course, he killed Osama bin Laden. In an 
influential article in The New York Times, 
Peter Bergen described Obama as ‘the warrior 
president.’7  
 
However, the Obama template for projecting 
American power has proven different from, and 
superior to, the approach of George W. Bush’s 
administration. For the most part, it has been 
disciplined, focused, and led by special forces 
and intelligence. Take the Bin Laden raid: it 
was a patient, intelligence-led, lightning 
operation against an enemy that had done 
America enormous harm. It was the opposite of 
the Iraq operation, which was an instinctive, 
military-led, lingering invasion of a state that 
had nothing to do with the 9/11 attacks. In its 
own way, Libya was also the opposite of Iraq. 
Obama must share the credit here with 
European leaders, in particular Britain’s David 
Cameron and France’s Nicolas Sarkozy. 
Working together, and in sync with Arab 
states, NATO was able to topple the regime in 
Tripoli in a way that maximised Libyan 
ownership of the victory and minimised the 
risks and the costs to the West. 
 
All in all, then, Obama has been an effective 
foreign policy president with a surprising 
preparedness to use force in the pursuit of US 
national interests. Unusually for a Democrat, 
he is regarded as strong on national security, 
and has a ten-point opinion poll lead over Mitt 
Romney when it comes to foreign policy.8 
 
It is harder, inevitably, to make judgments 
about Romney’s foreign policies were he to be 
elected president. He has never been a foreign 
policy-maker and his few interventions on the 
topic have not been especially impressive.9 Like 
Obama in 2008, Romney in 2012 is a foreign 
policy ‘puzzle.’ If we were to believe his 
rhetoric, then should he be elected president, 
the foreign policy right will be back in business. 
Romney has criticised Obama for being a serial 
apologiser, identified himself as a true believer 
in the freedom agenda, promised a more 
muscular approach toward America’s 
adversaries and vowed to usher in a new 
American Century.10  
 
If I squint my eyes, however, I find it hard to 
believe that Romney’s heart is in it. His 
character and experiences lead me to conclude 
that he would more likely be a careful, 
analytical foreign policy-maker, who based his 
decisions on expert advice and facts rather than 
intuition.11 He has been very careful, for 
example, in his comments about the use of 
force. He once even stated that he did not 
believe in expending so many resources 
pursuing Osama bin Laden, although he has 
since said that he would have ordered the strike 
on Osama.12 I suspect Romney would be a 
cautious, technocratic realist with some marked 
similarities to President Obama. As he said in 
his speech at The Citadel in Charleston, South 
Carolina, in October 2011: ‘Our next President 
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will face many difficult and complex foreign 
policy decisions. Few will be black and white.’13  
 
 
Why the similarities between Obama and 
Romney? 
 
There are at least four factors driving the 
convergence between the foreign policies of the 
two candidates. The first is the position of the 
United States in the world. Observers would do 
well not to believe all the hype about US 
decline. America’s US$15 trillion economy still 
looms over all the others. It still spends as 
much on its military as the rest of the world put 
together, and it is the only country that can 
project power almost anywhere on Earth. 
American culture is the world’s default culture. 
America’s opinions shape global opinions. The 
frailties of America’s rivals and adversaries are 
usually understudied. 
 
However, although both candidates dismiss the 
notion of US decline,14 there is no question the 
country is less powerful in relative terms than it 
was in the unipolar moment immediately after 
the end of the Cold War. Other powers are 
rising and Washington cannot get its own way 
all the time. Whoever is elected president will 
need to balance the historic tendency of the 
United States to act unilaterally against the 
need to work with other capitals to achieve its 
goals. 
 
Second, the United States has learnt lessons in 
the past decade that will inform its choices in 
the future – and would constrain any 
tendencies toward adventurism in a Romney 
administration. George W. Bush’s first-term 
policies, in particular the invasion of Iraq, went 
a long way toward discrediting unilateralism in 
the Washington policy-making environment. 
They weakened America, and emboldened her 
adversaries. In his second term, US foreign 
policy underwent a difficult shift from 
unilateralism to multilateralism, from a more 
ideological program to a more pragmatic one, 
from an overreliance on force to a more 
balanced array of approaches. This transition 
largely paid off, and the Obama administration 
has continued many of the themes of Bush’s 
second term.  
 
It seems unlikely that the US political system 
would easily accommodate a return to the 
foreign policies of the first Bush term. Could 
such lessons, learned at such great cost, now be 
unlearned? For example, historians in the 
future will wonder why the United States 
invaded and occupied an Arab state and 
squandered the sympathy it had received in 
much of the region as a result of the attacks on 
9/11. It seems hard to believe that the US 
system would allow another similar mistake to 
be committed so soon. 
 
Third, the temperaments of Obama and 
Romney are surprisingly similar. Both are 
careful, cautious, controlling people. Obama is 
disciplined, deliberate and cerebral. His aides 
describe him as a measured problem-solver 
who rarely rushes to judgment. He is 
preternaturally calm, as summed up in his 
moniker, ‘no drama Obama.’ Similarly, 
Romney thinks with his head, not his gut. 
(Additionally, there are counter-examples, such 
as his remarkable recent speech to a function 
for high-rolling fundraisers, which was 
videotaped secretly by an attendee.) Romney’s 
biographers write that as young man, he ‘knew 
that his powers ran less to creative than 
analytical.’15 His technocratic moderation 
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helped him to win the governorship of 
Massachusetts, a famously Democratic state, 
but undid him in his first attempt to win the 
Republican nomination in 2008, and nearly 
undid him again last year.  
 
Even Obama’s penchant for the TelePrompter 
and Romney’s proclivity for PowerPoint speak 
to a desire for order and control.16  
 
Finally, the two men’s backgrounds are not as 
dissimilar as they first appear. Sometimes the 
foreign policy styles of presidents show traces 
of their previous careers. Former actor Ronald 
Reagan liked a simple plot and a few good 
lines. Bill Clinton displayed a lawyer’s fondness 
for arguing both sides of an issue. George W. 
Bush, former managing partner of the Texas 
Rangers, believed that changing a single regime 
could solve the problems of the Middle East, 
just as a single hit can win a game of baseball. 
 
Mitt Romney was for some years a 
management consultant who relished the 
crunching of data to get at the truth. Indeed, he 
sometimes elevated data above its station. 
During one visit to his alma mater, Harvard 
Business School, The New York Times reported 
that he sought to prove ‘the value of family 
time based not on emotion but on yield.’ If 
HBS ‘students failed to invest sufficient time 
and energy in their spouses and children,’ 
Romney argued, ‘their families could become 
‘dogs’ – consultant-speak for drags on the rest 
of the company – sucking energy, time and 
happiness out of the students.’17 
 
Later Romney went into private equity at Bain 
Capital. But even that career move revealed his 
marked aversion to risk. He was reluctant to 
make the leap to the new firm, and only 
accepted the job offer once he had covered off 
every downside – he had a guarantee that he 
could return to consulting if private equity 
didn’t work, on his previous salary, under a 
cover story so that no one would know he had 
failed. Once in the job, Romney’s decision-
making style was a cautious one. When 
considering potential investments, his 
biographers note, he ‘met weekly with his 
young partners, pushing them for deeper 
analysis and more data and giving himself the 
final vote on whether to go forward.’18 
Romney’s professional background, therefore, 
marks him as careful, data-driven and 
disciplined, if a bit bloodless.  
 
Obama’s formative work experience was as a 
community organiser on the South Side of 
Chicago. Community organising and 
management consulting may seem at first to be 
worlds apart. But community organising is not 
a hippy affair. Community organisers are 
preoccupied with interests and power. 
Community organising is not about dropping 
out, it’s about organising to pursue the interests 
of their community. That means identifying 
who has the power, and engaging them.19 In 
other words, community organising is 
something like management consulting for poor 
people.  
 
The professional backgrounds of the two men, 
then, are not as different as they first seem. 
 
 
Foreign policy similarities 
 
In many of the areas that matter to Australia, 
there are strong continuities between the two 
candidates’ foreign policies. One such issue is 
their treatment of alliances. Early in his 
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national career, Obama was not especially 
alliance-focused. During his campaign for 
president in 2008, Obama did not always draw 
bright lines between allies and other states. 
Instead, he bracketed alliances with other, less 
intimate relationships, like partnerships and 
institutions. As the first president to come of 
age politically after the end of the Cold War, 
Obama did not seem to view alliances as 
special. Former ambassador to the United 
Nations John Bolton even charged that he had 
‘a post-alliance policy.’20 In office, however, 
President Obama has been more well-disposed 
toward alliances. In fact, in the Libyan case, the 
opposite charge is usually levelled: that he 
ceded too much ground to allies, by allowing 
Britain, France and other NATO allies to take 
the lead. Yet it would have been risky for the 
United States to lead another major military 
operation in the Middle East after a decade 
fighting two bloody wars nearby. 
 
Romney is likely to be even more focused on 
allies than Obama. He probably takes more of 
a ‘band of brothers’ approach to allies. Like 
McCain, he may incline toward the notion of 
the ‘Anglosphere’ (although that was not 
evident in his criticisms of the organisation of 
the London Olympics).21 If there is a difference, 
it may be that Obama is more willing to cede 
the primary position in some future operations 
to US allies, as he did in Libya. ‘In these 
situations’, he said recently, ‘we should have a 
bias towards operating multilaterally. Because 
the very process of building a coalition forces 
you to ask tough questions.’22 Perhaps Romney 
would be more alliance-focused, but also more 
determined to take the leading role in alliance 
operations. But there is not a binary difference 
between the two, as John Bolton would claim. 
 
A similar approach can be seen in relation to 
the so-called ‘pivot’ to Asia. I think ‘pivot’ is a 
misleading term. It implies that the United 
States previously had its back turned to Asia, 
which is wrong; and it implies that the United 
States will now turn its back on the Middle 
East, Europe and other parts of the world, 
which is also wrong. If you think for a minute 
of the massive changes taking place in the 
region as a result of the Arab uprisings, of 
continued instability in Afghanistan, of the 
threat posed by a nuclear-armed Iran, including 
to a close US ally such as Israel, it is clear that 
the United States cannot turn its back on the 
Middle East. I am reminded of Michael 
Corleone’s complaint in Godfather III: ‘just 
when I thought I was out, they pull me back 
in.’ 
 
A better way to characterise the shift is as a 
‘reweighting’ or, to use US Defense Secretary 
Leon Panetta’s term, a ‘rebalancing.’23 Obama 
believes that the United States has been overly 
invested in the Middle East. The country took a 
strategic detour by invading Iraq and its global 
posture is out of whack, being overinvested in 
the Middle East and underinvested in Asia, 
which is where America’s greatest future 
challenges and opportunities lie. The elements 
of this reweighting, which was conceptualised 
most clearly in Obama’s Canberra address, 
include more regular attendance at meetings of 
the various Asian multilateral organisations, 
the deployment of US Marines to Darwin, 
increased ship visits to Singapore and closer 
military ties with the Philippines.24  
 
There are many outstanding questions about 
the pivot, including America’s ability to finance 
it, even with the peace dividend from 
Afghanistan. But it makes strategic sense, so it 
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is hard to see Romney unpicking it. If anything, 
he would reinforce it. 
 
To a great degree, the pivot is about China. 
There is an uneven quality to China’s present 
foreign policy: usually quiet but occasionally 
strident; usually cautious but occasionally 
combative; always prickly; never entirely 
predictable. Obama is still seeking to develop 
the bilateral relationship with China – but he is 
doing so from a position of strength. He seems 
to have found the right balance of openness 
and toughness. His policy is not directed at 
containing China – but nor is he prepared to 
vacate the field. He seeks to cooperate with 
China, but he also intends to renew America’s 
presence in Asia and maintain a balance of 
forces in the region at a time when there is 
significant uncertainty about China’s future 
behaviour. 
 
Romney’s rhetoric on China has been several 
notches tougher, especially on economic 
matters. He has promised that ‘on day one of 
my administration I would label China a 
currency manipulator,’ and threatened to 
impose tariff penalties on China.25 He has 
argued for a stronger US military presence in 
the Asia-Pacific, and he has been quicker than 
Obama to condemn China’s mixed human-
rights record. When it appeared in May 2012 
that the blind dissident Chen Guangcheng had 
been returned to the Chinese authorities 
without adequate protections, Romney called it 
‘a dark day for freedoms, and… a day of shame 
for the Obama administration.’26 However, as 
Michael Swaine and Oliver Palmer have 
argued, Romney’s China policy is for the most 
part narrowly drawn, ‘leaving many issues 
untouched and others only indirectly 
addressed.’27 It is hard to imagine this former 
management consultant buying into a ‘clash of 
civilisations’ with China, or muscling up to 
Beijing in a provocative manner. A 
continuation of the Obama approach seems 
more likely.  
 
When it comes to US allies in Asia, Obama has 
become an enthusiast. He has visited three 
Asian treaty allies – Japan, South Korea and 
Australia – and he helped get the South Korean 
Free Trade Agreement through the Congress. 
Regarding the US-Australia alliance, it is 
difficult to imagine the two presidents would 
treat it in notably different ways. Obama has 
formed good personal relations with Prime 
Ministers Kevin Rudd and Julia Gillard, and he 
elected to give his principal speech on the pivot 
to the Australian Parliament in Canberra. 
Romney’s connections with Australia are not 
known, although some of his advisers such as 
former World Bank president Bob Zoellick and 
former State Department director of policy 
planning Mitchell Reiss are long-term friends of 
Australia. In his book No Apology, Romney 
listed Australians along with Canadians, 
Britons, Poles, and Czechs as peoples who 
‘engage wherever freedom needs defenders.’28  
 
One might imagine that an Obama-Gillard axis 
or a Romney-Abbott axis would be a better fit 
than Obama-Abbott or Romney-Gillard. The 
truth is, however, that whichever combination 
of the Rubik’s Cube of political leadership 
clicks into place, the alliance will be secure. 
There is a deep alliance at work here, driven by 
institutionalised bureaucratic, military and 
intelligence cooperation, that grinds on 
regardless of the personalities of the political 
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The war in Afghanistan provides another 
example of foreign policy convergence between 
the two candidates. Obama’s policy is to cease 
US combat operations in the summer of 2013, 
and withdraw nearly all troops by the end of 
2014. He has lost his appetite for a full 
counterinsurgency strategy. He apparently no 
longer believes that US and other coalition 
forces can bring stability to Afghanistan.29 
Romney has attacked Obama repeatedly, 
saying he has harmed US interests by setting 
these timetables for withdrawal. He is certainly 
more hawkish in tone. But the substance of the 
policy is hardly different: he has his own 
timetable for withdrawing most troops by the 
close of 2014, even if he inserts a caveat that 
withdrawal will only occur when the Pentagon 
believes the mission is complete.30 In any case, 
there would be little public support for 
continuing the war even if Romney wanted to. 
Recent polls indicate that 72 per cent of 
Americans oppose the war in Afghanistan, 61 
per cent of Americans think the US is not 
winning the war, and 77 per cent want all US 
troops withdrawn this year.31 In such an 
environment, it is hard to imagine a President 
Romney ordering a second surge. 
 
When it comes to Syria, both candidates hope 
for the emergence of a stable Syria, not run by 
Bashar al-Assad, that is independent from 
Iranian interests. Both have called for Assad to 
go, and have supported sanctions against the 
regime in Damascus and assistance to the 
Syrian opposition (though they both have 
concerns about the professionalism and 
ideology of elements of that opposition). 
Neither has evinced any enthusiasm for direct 
military intervention in Syria, although Obama 
has warned that Damascus’s use of WMD 
would represent a ‘red line’ for his 
administration. And although Vice President 
Joe Biden has accused Mitt Romney of wanting 
to go to war with Syria and Iran, Romney has 
been noticeably less hawkish on Syria than his 
immediate predecessor as Republican candidate 
for president, Senator John McCain, who 
claimed recently that on this issue, ‘our 
president is not being true to our values.32 
 
Relations with Iran constitute another case 
where the closer one looks, the less stark are 
the differences between the Democratic and 
Republican standard-bearers. President Obama 
started off trying to engage the mullahs, but he 
quickly toughened his policy. He has instituted 
a very tough sanctions regime, one which is, as 
David Sanger from The New York Times notes, 
‘far more crippling to the Iranian economy than 
anything President Bush did between the public 
revelation of Iran’s nuclear enrichment facilities 
in 2003 and the end of Mr Bush’s term in early 
2009.’ The administration has worked with 
Israel to run various covert and cyber 
campaigns to slow Iran’s nuclear program. The 
president has refused to rule out the use of 
force to interrupt the program, and he has said 
explicitly: ‘I do not have a policy of 
containment.’ Experts are divided on the 
circumstances in which he would go ahead with 
a US military strike.33 
 
Romney has been critical of Obama’s approach 
and compared the leadership in Tehran – which 
he describes as ‘unalloyed evil’34– to the regimes 
in Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany.35 In early 
2012, Romney claimed: ‘if we re-elect Barack 
Obama, Iran will have a nuclear weapon. And 
if we elect Mitt Romney, if you elect me as the 
next president, they will not have a nuclear 
weapon.’36 On the other hand, it is hard to 
identify how his policy is different from 
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Obama’s. Romney argues for severe sanctions 
on Iran, but it is not clear how much more 
severe they can get, or how much more 
effective, given persistent ‘leakage’ from 
incomplete international cooperation.37 At the 
beginning of Obama’s term, there was daylight 
between the president’s position and that of his 
conservative critics; now there is little. 
Weighing Romney’s rhetoric, it may seem that 
he would be more likely than Obama to 
authorise a military strike against the nuclear 
program. Then again, the riskiness of that 
option stayed George Bush’s hand – and 




Foreign policy differences 
 
This is not to say that the foreign policies of the 
two candidates are identical. They are not. 
There are many differences between their 
worldviews. Differences at the centre can 
matter a great deal in the rest of the world, 
where their effects are felt – in particular in 
those countries directly affected by the matter 
in question. And the implementation of their 
policies would be quite different. 
 
One big difference between the two men is that 
the next four years would be Obama’s second 
term as president, but Romney’s first. Obama 
has grown enormously in office. He has got 
better at making decisions. He has learned from 
his mistakes, and toughened up.38 During his 
first year in office, for example, he persistently 
sought to accommodate Beijing’s interests and 
claims. This approach was reasonable, given 
China’s growing influence, new-found 
confidence and legitimate aspirations. Yet 
Beijing failed to clasp his outstretched hand. 
The Chinese pocketed his concessions and 
made few of their own. The men in 
Zhongnanhai were not impressed by Obama’s 
life story, his uplifting speeches or his 
Portuguese water dog. In response, Obama’s 
China policy hardened: he proceeded with arms 
sales to Taiwan; after many delays, he met the 
Dalai Lama; in his address to the Australian 
Parliament in November 2011, he critiqued 
China’s human rights record, declaring that 
‘prosperity without freedom is just another 
form of poverty.’39 The stiffening of US policy 
gave pause to Beijing and both sides seemed to 
reach a modus vivendi.  
 
If Romney were to win, he would have his own 
learning-curve to climb. The first months could 
well be difficult. He would certainly be tested. 
On the other hand, as a first-term president he 
would have an advantage over Obama. If 
Obama were re-elected, then two or three years 
into his second term, his credit would start to 
run out, and the eyes of Americans and world 
leaders would start to turn to his likely 
successor. Barring a spectacular failure on 
Romney’s part which made his re-election 
impossible, he would be less susceptible to the 
lame-duck effect than Obama would be. 
 
Another difference that should be mentioned 
concerns personnel. The type of people 
appointed by a president to the big jobs in the 
White House, the State Department and the 
Pentagon always has a very significant 
influence on the temper of an administration’s 
foreign policy. After nearly four years, we have 
a sense of the template Obama prefers: highly 
competent, disciplined and loyal policy 
engineers who are largely content to implement 
his vision rather than argue with him over it. 
Romney is a more protean character, so the 
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identity of his foreign policy picks is likely to 
matter more. His stable of foreign policy 
advisers includes orthodox realists, muscular 
unilateralists and the occasional recalcitrant 
neoconservative. Exactly who he selected from 
that stable would be critical. As a bellwether 
for his administration’s direction, for example, 
it would be important to watch the fate of Bob 
Zoellick, the former World Bank president who 
is advising Romney on transition issues, and 
John Bolton, the conservative provocateur who 
took care to endorse Romney even after Newt 
Gingrich declared that Bolton should be 
Secretary of State.40  
 
On substantive foreign policy issues, one of the 
largest, and oddest, differences concerns 
Russia, where Obama has ‘reset’ the 
relationship and Romney has vowed to ‘reset 
the reset.’ John Bolton has even mused that 
tensions in the relationship could ‘break the 
famous “reset” button beyond repair.’41 Obama 
has made the improvement of Russian ties a 
priority, building a close rapport with former 
President Dmitry Medvedev and reaching out 
to Vladimir Putin after his return to the 
Kremlin. He has pushed for cooperation on 
bases and nuclear arms reduction, signing the 
New START Treaty in 2010, which included a 
30 per cent cut to strategic nuclear warheads.42 
By contrast, Romney has claimed that Moscow 
is America’s ‘number one geopolitical foe,’ a 
boast that must surely have offended officials in 
Pyongyang and Tehran.43 His campaign has 
described Russia as ‘a destabilizing force on the 
world stage’ that ‘needs to be tempered.’44 
Republicans made merry after Obama’s ‘hot-
mic’ incident earlier this year, when Obama 
was overheard on a live microphone asking 
Medvedev for ‘space’ and promising greater 
‘flexibility’ on missile defence negotiations after 
the election, and Medvedev undertook to 
‘transmit this information to Vladimir.’45 
Relations with Russia, then, represent a clear 
point of difference.  
 
There are obvious contrasts between the two 
men when it comes to the United Nations and 
multilateral institutions. Obama is a UN 
supporter, although not a UN groupie. In 2006, 
he said: ‘nobody benefits more than we do 
from the observance of international “rules of 
the road.”’46 He believes that the United States 
is stronger when it works through institutions 
as well as allies to project American power. He 
has used force unilaterally on many occasions, 
but it seems inconceivable that he would, for 
example, order the invasion of another country 
in the absence of a UN Security Council 
Resolution, except in the most extreme 
circumstances. Romney, by contrast, is a UN 
skeptic and has argued that Washington ought 
to support some kind of league of 
democracies.47 He believes that UN bodies ‘can 
become forums for the tantrums of tyrants and 
the airing of the world’s most ancient of 
prejudices: anti-Semitism.’ Romney has 
promised to ‘return these bodies to their proper 
role.’48 
 
Obama and Romney also differ in their 
approach to Israel. The president’s relationship 
with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and 
his government has been scratchy, which 
contributed to Obama’s failure to make any 
headway on peace negotiations between the 
Israelis and Palestinians. Rightly or wrongly, 
Obama is seen as being cool toward Israelis; he 
has never visited the Jewish state as president. 
Romney has also been sharply critical of 
Obama’s approach, accusing him of being ‘a 
fair-weather friend’ and charging that he ‘threw 
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Israel under the bus.’ Romney declared in his 
now infamous speech at the private fundraiser 
that the Palestinians ‘have no interest’ in peace 
and that the conflict is going to remain ‘an 
unsolved problem.’ He promised that his first 
foreign trip would include Israel. Obama’s 
response is that he has initiated ‘the closest 
military cooperation between our two countries 
in history’, (which is a stretch given that in 
1973 the US military’s resupply of Israel during 
the Yom Kippur War in 1973 helped save Israel 
from defeat). Still, there is no doubt that on 
Obama’s watch the US and Israeli militaries 
and intelligence services have worked very 
closely on the Iran nuclear file.49 
 
It is evident that a President Romney would put 
a greater premium on close ties between the 
United States and Israel, especially if 
Netanyahu remains in the Prime Minister’s 
residence. Romney and Netanyahu are 
personally close, having worked together more 
than three decades ago as young management 
consultants at the Boston Consulting Group. 
Romney has said the two ‘almost speak in 
shorthand… We share common experiences 
and have a perspective and underpinning which 
is similar.’50  
 
Finally, the issue of international trade provides 
a contrast between the two candidates. Obama 
is likely a free trader by instinct. Everything we 
know about him – his comfort with 
globalisation, his preference for multilateralism 
and his cerebral approach to policy – points in 
that direction. In 2011, the president signed 
long-stalled trade agreements with South 
Korea, Colombia and Panama.51 But much of 
the Democratic Party, including most of its 
congressional wing, is protectionist, having 
shifted ground markedly since the Clinton 
administration. Romney, by contrast, is a more 
full-blooded free-trader, and most 
congressional Republicans would be with him 
on that issue.52 So it seems likely that Romney 
would be prepared to push harder and take 






President Obama and Governor Romney are 
very different individuals. Their rhetoric on 
foreign policy is worlds apart; even on 
substance, there are important differences on 
countries such as Russia and Israel. Their work 
experience certainly cannot be compared: 
Obama has proven to be a skilful and effective 
commander-in-chief; as is the case with most 
candidates for president, Romney’s experience 
is minimal. For all that, it is hard to discern a 
fundamental clash in worldviews.  
 
Americans have a foreign policy choice to make 
in November. Their choice will be felt here in 
















A n a l y s i s  
The Audacity of Reasonableness 
                                                          
NOTES 
1 Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the 
Democratic National Convention, Charlotte, NC, 




2 Mitt Romney, Speech to the Republican National 
Convention, Tampa Bay, Florida, Business Insider, 
30 August 2012: 
http://www.businessinsider.com/mitt-romney-speech-
convention-republican-rnc-gop-2012-8. 
3 Gideon Rachman, If you liked George W. Bush, 
you’ll love Mitt Romney. Financial Times, 30 July 
2012: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/33c08e06-d802-
11e1-9980-00144feabdc0.html; Bruce W. Jentleson 
and Charles A. Kupchan, A dangerous mind. Foreign 
Policy, 30 August 2012: 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/08/30/a_
dangerous_mind_mitt_romney. See also Fareed 
Zakaria, Failure to launch: Why Romney’s critique 
of Obama’s foreign policy record will not fly. TIME, 
6 August 2012: 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2
120500,00.html. Peter Naker disagrees: Peter Baker, 
Romney and Obama strain to show gap on foreign 




4 Bruce Stokes, Does the world want Romney or 
Obama?, CNN, 27 August 2012: 
http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/08/27/
does-world-want-romney-or-obama/; Pew Global 
Attitudes Project Pew Research Center, Global 
Opinion of Obama Slips, International Policies 
Faulted, 13 June 2012: 
http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/06/13/global-
opinion-of-obama-slips-international-policies-
faulted/; Fergus Hanson, The Lowy Institute Poll 
                                                                                   
2012: Public opinion and foreign policy. Sydney, 
Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2012, p 10; 
Fergus Hanson, The Lowy Institute Poll 2008. 
Australia and the world: Public opinion and foreign 
policy. Sydney, Lowy Institute for International 
Policy, 2008. 
5 Michael Fullilove, Hope or glory? The presidential 
election, US foreign policy and Australia. Lowy 
Institute Analysis. Sydney, Lowy Institute for 
International Policy, October 2008. 
6 Fullilove, Hope or glory? The presidential election, 
US foreign policy and Australia, pp 7-8; David 
Brooks, Obama admires Bush. The New York 
Times, 16 May 2008: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/16/opinion/16bro
oks.html?_r=0; Fareed Zakaria, Transcript. Obama 
interviewed; economic situation; U.S. infrastructure 
woes, CNN, 13 July 2008: 
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0807/13/f
zgps.01.html; Barack Obama, Barack Obama’s 
acceptance speech at the Democratic National 
Convention, Denver. The New York Times, 28 
August 2008: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/28/us/politics/28te
xt-obama.html?pagewanted=all; Fareed Zakaria, 
Obama abroad. Newsweek 152 (4) 2008. 
7 Barack Obama, Transcript: Obama’s speech 
against the Iraq War, NPR, 20 January 2009: 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyI
d=99591469; Peter L. Bergen, Warrior in Chief. The 
New York Times, 28 April 2012: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/29/opinion/sunday
/president-obama-warrior-in-chief.html?_r=5; David 
E. Sanger, Obama order sped up wave of 




iran.html?_r=2&smid=tw-share; Jo Becker and Scott 
Shane, Secret ‘kill list’ proves a test of Obama’s 
  
Page 15 
A n a l y s i s  
The Audacity of Reasonableness 
                                                                                   




Figures are taken from the following sources: Bureau 
of Investigative Journalism, Obama 2009 Pakistan 
strikes. 10 August 2011: 
http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2011/08/10/o
bama-2009-strikes/; New America Foundation, The 
year of the drone: an analysis of U.S. drone strikes in 
Pakistan, 2004-2012. October 2012: 
http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones; 
Stanford International Human Rights and Conflict 
Resolution Clinic (Stanford Law School) and Global 
Justice Clinic (NYU School of Law), Living under 
drones: death, injury and trauma to civilians from 
US drone practices in Pakistan. September 2012: 
http://livingunderdrones.org/report/; Peter Bergen 
and Megan Braun, Drone is Obama's weapon of 
choice. CNN, 19 September 2012: 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/05/opinion/bergen-
obama-drone/index.html; Predator drones and 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The New York 
Times, 26 September 2012: 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/s
ubjects/u/unmanned_aerial_vehicles/index.html.  
8 Jeff Zeleny and Megan Thee-Brenan, Poll finds 
Obama is erasing Romney’s edge on economy. The 




9 Kevin King, What’s Mitt’s foreign policy? The 






Will Marshall, The “vision thing”: Mitt Romney’s 
                                                                                   
vapid foreign policy. The American Interest, 1 August 
2012: http://the-american-
interest.com/article.cfm?piece=1289;  
Ben Armbruster, Romney adviser: Mitt ‘doesn’t 
want to really engage’ on foreign policy issues until 




10 Romney for President, An American century: a 
strategy to secure America’s enduring interests and 
ideals, 7 October 2011: 
http://www.mittromney.com/sites/default/files/shared
/AnAmericanCentury-WhitePaper_0.pdf;  
Mitt Romney, Mitt Romney’s remarks on foreign 





Speech to the Republican National Convention, 
Tampa Bay, Florida.  
11 For examples of Romney’s approach to decision-
making, see Michael Kranish and Scott Helman, The 
real Romney. New York, Harper Collins, 2012, pp 
6-7, 133, 137, 312. 
12 Beth Fouhy, Romney: Obama shouldn’t use OBL 
in campaign. Air Force Times, 1 May 2012: 
http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2012/05/ap-
mitt-romney-says-president-obama-shouldnt-use-
osama-bin-laden-in-campaign-050112/; Ana Marie 




13 Romney, Mitt Romney’s remarks on foreign policy 
at The Citadel, SC. 
14 Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in State 
of the Union Address, The White House, Office of 
the Press Secretary, 24 January 2012: 
  
Page 16 
A n a l y s i s  
The Audacity of Reasonableness 
                                                                                   
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2012/01/24/remarks-president-state-union-
address; Mitt Romney, No apology: the case for 
American greatness. New York, St Martin’s Press, 
2010, p 35. 
15 Kranish and Helman, The real Romney, p 141. 
16 Philip Rucker, Republicans mock Obama’s 





Marcus, Romney you can’t govern by powerpoint. 




17 Jodi Kantor, At Harvard, a Master’s in problem 
solving. The New York Times, 24 December 2011: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/25/us/politics/how
-harvard-shaped-mitt-romney.html?pagewanted=all. 
18 Kranish and Helman, The real Romney, pp 6-7, 
133, 137. 
19 Michael Fullilove, Obama at the UN: the world’s 





20 John R. Bolton, One world? He’s on a different 
planet. Los Angeles Times, 26 July 2008: 
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jul/26/opinion/oe-
bolton26. 
21 David Blair and Barney Henderson, Mitt Romney 
questions whether Britain is ready for Olympic 




                                                                                   




23 Leon E. Panetta, Speech at the Shangri-La Security 
Dialogue, delivered by Secretary of Defense Leon E. 
Panetta. 2 June 2012: 
http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speech
id=1681. 
24 Barack Obama, Remarks by President Obama to 
the Australian Parliament, The White House, Office 




25 Bill Rigby, Romney sharpens attack on China’s 
economic policies. Reuters, 13 October 2011: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/14/us-usa-
campaign-romney-china-idUSTRE79D00E20111014. 
26 Ewen MacAskill and Tania Branigan, Romney 
calls US treatment of Chen Guangchen ‘dark day for 
freedom’. The Guardian, 3 May 2012: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/may/03/mitt-
romney-cheng-guangcheng-freedom. 
27 Michael Swaine and Oliver Palmer, Understanding 
Romney on China. The Diplomat, 1 February 2012: 
http://the-diplomat.com/2012/02/01/understanding-
romney-on-china/. 
28 Romney, No apology: the case for American 
greatness, p 293. 
29 David E. Sanger, Charting Obama’s journey to a 




share&_rmoc.semityn.www; Text of Obama’s 






A n a l y s i s  
The Audacity of Reasonableness 
                                                                                   
Micah Zenko, Obama’s Afghanistan strategy: 
signaling intent. In Politics, Power, and Preventive 
Action, 7 May 2012: 
http://blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2012/05/07/obamas-
afghanistan-strategy-signaling-intent/. 
30 Jr. Richard A. Oppel, Romney’s critique of war 




likely.html?pagewanted=all; Blake Hounshell, 
Romney offers politics, not a plan, on Afghanistan, 
CNN, 23 April 2012: 
http://edition.cnn.com/2012/04/23/opinion/hounshell
-afghanistan-romney/index.html. 
31 Afghanistan, PollingReport.com, July 2012: 
http://www.pollingreport.com/afghan.htm; Deborah 
Charles, Americans favor limited U.S. role in 
Afghanistan. Reuters, 4 May 2012: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/04/us-
afghanistan-usa-poll-idUSBRE8431LQ20120504. 
32 Syria crisis: Obama rejects US military 
intervention, BBC News, 7 March 2012: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-
17278802; Mark Landler, Romney calls for action 
on Syria, but his party is divided. The New York 
Times, 29 May 2012: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/30/world/middleea
st/romney-condemns-obamas-syria-policy.html?_r=1; 
Romney for President, An American century: a 
strategy to secure America’s enduring interests and 
ideals; John McCain, Speech to the National 
Republican Convention, Tampa, Florida. The 
Huffington Post, 29 August 2012: 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/29/john-
mccain-republican-convention-
speech_n_1830053.html.  Romney has said that as 
president he would work to ensure that elements of 
the Syrian opposition ‘who share our values’ could 
obtain the weapons they need, but he has been 
                                                                                   
careful not to specify exactly what this means or 
who would provide the weapons. 
33 Sanger, Obama order sped up wave of 
cyberattacks against Iran; Barack Obama, Remarks 
by the President at AIPAC Policy Conference, The 
White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 4 March 
2012:   http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2012/03/04/remarks-president-aipac-policy-
conference-0; David E. Sanger, Is there a Romney 




34 Chris Cillizza, Romney on Iran: “unalloyed evil”. 
In The Fix, 19 October 2009: 
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/thefix/eye-on-
2012/romney-on-iran-unalloyed-evil.html. 
35 Mitt Romney, Iran: biggest threat since Soviets. In 
Human Events, 22 October 2009: 
http://www.humanevents.com/2009/10/22/iran-
biggest-threat-since-soviets/.  
36 Romney position on Iran: Romney speaking at the 
ABCNews - WMURTV GOP Debate at St. Anselm 
College, New Hampshire, 2012 Republican 
Candidates, 2 January 2012: http://2012.republican-
candidates.org/Romney/Iran.php. 
37 Sanger, Is there a Romney doctrine?; Jennifer 
Epstein, White House insists Iran sanctions are 
working. In Politico, 31 July 2012: 
http://www.politico.com/politico44/2012/07/white-
house-insists-iran-sanctions-are-working-
130653.html; Ted Galen Carpenter, Iran sanctions 
leakage. In The National Interest, 23 March 2012: 
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/iran-
sanctions-leakage-6688. 
38 James Fallows, Obama, explained. The Atlantic, 
March 2012. 




A n a l y s i s  
The Audacity of Reasonableness 
                                                                                   
40 Emily Schultheis, John Bolton endorses Mitt Romney’s 
2012 presidential run, Politico, 11 January 2012: 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0112/71357.html. 
41 Mitt Romney, Russia, Romney for President, 
2012: http://www.mittromney.com/issues/russia; 
John R. Bolton, What to do about Syria? National 
Review Online, 11 June 2012: 
http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/302104/wha
t-do-about-syria-john-r-bolton?pg=2.  
42 Martin S. Indyk, Kenneth G. Lieberthal and 
Michael E. O’Hanlon, Bending history: Barack 
Obama’s foreign policy. Washington, DC, The 
Brookings Institution, 2012, p 195. 
43 Mitt Romney: Russia is our number one 
geopolitical foe. Pravda, 27 March 2012: 
http://english.pravda.ru/news/world/27-03-
2012/120899-mitt_romney_russia-0/. 
44 Romney, Russia. 
45 Pema Levy, How Romney fumbled the ‘hot mic’ 
opportunity. In Talking points memo, 1 April 2012: 
http://2012.talkingpointsmemo.com/2012/04/how-
mitt-romney-fumbled-the-hot-mic-opportunity.php. 
46 Barack Obama, The audacity of hope. New York, 
Crown Publishers, 2006, p 309. 
47 Jim Davenport, Romney calls United Nations a 
‘failure’. USA Today, 18 October 2007: 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/politics/2007-10-18-
3780161369_x.htm. 
48 Romney, Mitt Romney’s remarks on foreign policy 
at The Citadel, SC. 
49 Ken Thomas, Romney: Palestinians not interested 
in peace. Miami Herald, 17 September 2012: 
http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/09/17/3007144/r
omney-shifts-message-to-challenge.html; Romney for 
President, An American century: a strategy to secure 
America’s enduring interests and ideals; Romney: 
Obama threw Israel under the bus. In Israel Hayom 
newsletter, 28 October 2011: 
http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_article.p
hp?id=1601; Mitt Romney, Mitt Romney delivers 
                                                                                   




policy-conference; Obama, Remarks by the President 
in State of the Union Address; Jim Garamone, 
Panetta seeks to further strengthen U.S.-Israel 




50 Michael Barbaro, A friendship dating to 1976 




friends.html?pagewanted=all; Romney, Mitt Romney 
delivers remarks to AIPAC Policy Conference. 
51 Roger Runningen, Obama signs trade deals with 
South Korea, Panama, Colombia, Bloomberg.com, 




52 Mitt Romney, Trade, Romney for President, 2012: 
http://www.mittromney.com/issues/trade. 









Dr Michael Fullilove is the Executive Director of the Lowy Institute for International Policy. 
 
Dr Fullilove has been associated with the Lowy Institute since its establishment. He wrote the 
feasibility study for the Institute in 2002 and has served as Director of its Global Issues Program 
since 2003. He has also worked as a Visiting Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings 
Institution in Washington, DC, an adviser to Prime Minister Paul Keating, and a lawyer. He 
remains a Nonresident Senior Fellow at Brookings. 
 
He writes widely on Australian foreign policy, US foreign policy and global issues in 
publications including The New York Times, Financial Times, The Washington Post, The Daily 
Beast, The Washington Quarterly, The National Interest and Foreign Affairs, as well as the 
Australian press. He is a sought-after media commentator and speaker both in Australia and 
abroad. His next book, on Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Second World War, will be published 
by The Penguin Press in the United States and Australia in 2013. 
 
Dr Fullilove graduated in arts and law from the Universities of Sydney and New South Wales, 
with dual university medals. He also studied as a Rhodes Scholar at the University of Oxford, 
where he took a master's degree and a doctorate in international relations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
www.lowyinstitute.org 
